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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in advancing an aggressive proarbitration campaign since the mid-1980s, transformed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 1 -enacted in 1925 and not amended materially since then-from a statute that forbids judicial discrimination against arbitration agreements to a powerful source of anti-consumer substantive arbitration law.
2 Whether the interpreted CompuCredit as a statement of FAA supremacy over other federal statutes, 13 setting the stage for a confrontation between the policies of the FAA and the countervailing policies of other federal laws. In particular, those seeking to limit the ability of investors to bring class actions assert that the FAA requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements with class action waivers in all instances.
14 The broker-dealer Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab) recently made this argument in challenging the arbitration rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the self-regulatory organization (SRO) for broker-dealers.
15
Virtually all brokerage firms include provisions in their standard-form customer agreements requiring arbitration of customers' disputes in the FINRA forum.
16 These customers, like other consumers of products and services, may have disputes against their broker-dealers that are more efficiently handled if they are aggregated and indeed may not be feasible to pursue otherwise. 17 In fall 2011, only a few months after AT&T Mobility, Schwab amended its customer agreement to require its brokerage customers to waive their rights to bring class actions in court and even to prevent arbitrators from consolidating similar claims submitted by a discrete number of customers.
18 According to Schwab, "it acted to protect its shareholders and customers from the high costs Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that arbitration provisions in brokerage contracts are enforceable with respect to claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933).
13. See, e.g., Opinion from Cyril Moscow, Esq., to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (SEC) (Jan. 12, 2012) (asserting that in CompuCredit the Court was "emphatic that general anti-waiver provisions, such as the one in section 29(a) [of the Exchange Act], are not a barrier to the enforcement of an arbitration provision pursuant to the FAA") (on file with authors).
14. Id. (asserting that AT&T Mobility makes clear that "class actions are not essential to the vindication of statutory rights"). and inefficiencies associated with customer class actions." 19 FINRA promptly instituted a disciplinary action against Schwab, charging it with violating FINRA Conduct Rules that barred Schwab's amendment. 20 In turn, Schwab sued FINRA in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the FAA bars FINRA from enforcing its rules regulating broker-dealers' arbitration agreements.
21 A magistrate judge dismissed Schwab's complaint for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies without addressing the merits.
22 Schwab did not appeal the dismissal and indicated that it will not enforce the class action waiver until the FINRA disciplinary action is final.
23
The typical consumer contract containing a predispute arbitration agreement (PDAA) differs in a number of important ways from a brokerage agreement containing a PDAA. Since McMahon, FINRA, with prodding from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has engaged in ongoing review and reform of its arbitration rules in order to make the arbitration process fairer for investors. 24 Under the Exchange Act, FINRA's rules are subject to SEC review and approval: the SEC must approve FINRA's rules, after a public comment period, if it finds they are consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and are designed to protect investors and the public interest. 25 FINRA rules require broker-dealers to alert customers to the inclusion of a PDAA in the customer agreement and to provide information about the arbitration process and, in particular, how it differs from court.
26
Besides disclosure, FINRA also regulates the arbitration process to a 19 . Complaint degree that commercial arbitration forums may not 27 and prohibits firms from placing any condition in a PDAA that limits or contradicts any FINRA rule.
28
Notably, FINRA does not permit class arbitrations in its forum because it views courts as better equipped to handle complex procedures.
29 FINRA, however, does permit, under certain circumstances, multiple claimants to combine claims containing common questions of law and fact in the same arbitration.
30 In contrast to typical consumer agreements like the one at issue in AT&T Mobility, FINRA does not permit brokerage agreements to contain prohibitions on judicial class actions.
31 Accordingly, customers that have claims against a brokerage firm suitable for class action treatment are permitted to institute a class action in court, 32 and the firm cannot enforce the PDAA against a 27. For example, under the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, FINRA R. 12000-12905 (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups /arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@arbion/documents/arbmed/p117546.pdf [hereinafter FINRA CUSTOMER CODE], the location of the hearing is determined by the investor's residence (R. 12213), extensive document discovery is permitted, and time-consuming and costly depositions are discouraged (R. 12505-12513), and costly and potentially forumprohibitive dispositive motions are stringently limited (R. 12504). Perhaps most significantly, the forum subsidizes or even waives investors ' 30 . FINRA CUSTOMER CODE R. 12312(a) (if the claims assert any right to relief jointly and severally or the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions and occurrences). The Director or the panel may separate the claims into two or more arbitrations. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12312(b). In addition, the Director has the discretion to combine separate but related claims into one arbitration, subject to the panel's reconsideration upon motion of a party. CUSTOMER CODE R. 12314.
31. FINRA R. 2268(d)(3). 32 . Customers may bring federal securities fraud class actions under Rule 10b-5, alleging that the broker-dealer made material misstatements to a class of customers, so long as they can plead scienter with the specificity required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 member of the class so long as the class action appears viable.
33
For example, purchasers of a Schwab mutual fund, the YieldPlus Fund, brought class actions against Charles Schwab entities, including the brokerdealer, alleging that they misrepresented the risk profile and assets of the fund and improperly changed the fund's investment policies. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants issued, underwrote and distributed the shares in violation of federal securities and state laws.
34 Because a number of the investors had brokerage accounts with Schwab, if the Schwab arbitration language had been in effect and were enforceable, they would have been required to arbitrate individual claims. At least for investors whose damages were small, this would not be an optimal outcome. In approving the class action settlement, the court noted that the resolution offered "substantial recoveries" that "will provide real benefits" to the investors. 35 The average estimated settlement payment in the federal action was $881, 36 an amount that would not have made individual arbitration feasible.
Schwab is not the only firm that has attempted, in the wake of AT&T Mobility, to limit investors' access to courts. In early 2012, Carlyle Group LP amended a registration statement it filed with the SEC for an initial public offering of its limited partnership units to disclose that the Carlyle partnership agreement would require investors to arbitrate all disputes with the LP, including federal securities claims. It also would provide that investors may only bring claims in their individual capacities, arbitrators could not consolidate claims, and the proceedings, including any awards, were confidential.
37 Carlyle stated that it included the provision because it believed "that arbitrating claims would be more efficient, cost effective and beneficial to 40 Carlyle subsequently announced that it was dropping the arbitration provision, so as not to delay the offering.
41
As a third example of recent attempts to limit investors' access to courts, in spring 2012, shareholders sought to include in the proxy statements of four publicly-traded corporations identical proposals to amend the bylaws to require arbitration of all shareholders' claims, including federal securities claims, and to bar class actions. 42 The proponents explained that adoption of the proposal would be beneficial because " [l] 
50
Several influential academics contend that AT&T Mobility and CompuCredit permit public companies to prohibit investors' aggregation of claims in customer agreements and shareholder documents.
51 Although the Carlyle and shareholder proposals mentioned above are now off the table and thus present no controversy ripe for adjudication, the issue is certainly not dead, and it is likely that other issuers will brave public criticism and challenge the SEC's opposition to class waivers at some time in the future.
Meanwhile, the Schwab-FINRA controversy seems unlikely to settle. There is no question that Schwab has agreements with its customers that require arbitration of customers' disputes, the terms of these agreements are regulated pursuant to FINRA rules, and FINRA rules are, in turn, subject to SEC approval under the Exchange Act.
52 FINRA wants to uphold its rules, and Schwab appears determined to fight FINRA, perhaps ultimately to the Supreme Court. enforceability of arbitration agreements. This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we summarize current Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence that establishes a strong national proarbitration policy and discuss in detail the AT&T Mobility decision preempting a state judicial doctrine declaring class action waivers in an arbitration agreement unconscionable. In Part II, we describe the Exchange Act's regulation of arbitration involving broker-dealers, including its anti-waiver provision barring any condition that forces investors to waive compliance with any part of the Act, its rules and SRO rules, and its authority delegated to the SEC and FINRA to regulate the content of arbitration clauses in brokerdealer/customer contracts. Part III details the current litigation and regulatory dispute between Schwab and FINRA over Schwab's inclusion of a class action waiver in its customer agreement. In Part IV, we demonstrate that Schwab's conduct poses a clear conflict between the FAA and the Exchange Act. We argue that courts should resolve this conflict by applying the Exchange Act over the FAA through the long-standing doctrine of implied repeal, additional well-accepted canons of statutory construction, as well as current Exchange Act and FAA jurisprudence.
I. THE FAA PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate."
62 Its primary substantive provision, § 2-which declares that agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"
63 -"embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts." 64 Thus, the FAA's "principal purpose" was to "require[] courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms."
The Court has repeatedly held that the FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." 66 In the past four decades, the Court's FAA wage collection actions to be resolved in court). The Supreme Court has explained that it will find a state law preempted by a congressional act when: (1) the federal law expressly provides it displaces state law (express preemption); (2) Congress intends the federal law in an area to "occupy the field" (field preemption); (3) it is impossible for a party to comply with both the state and federal law (impossibility preemption); and (4) the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress (obstacle preemption 75 For example, in Cassarotto, which arose out of a franchisor-franchisee dispute, the Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring that, to be enforceable, an arbitration agreement must include very specific disclosures that it is subject to arbitration and in a very specific way ("typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract").
76 Because this pro-consumer notice requirement applied only to arbitration agreements and not contracts generally, the Court concluded that the law singled out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment and was displaced by the FAA.
77
Most recently, in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 78 the Court held that the FAA preempted a state law that on its face was not anti-arbitration but was being applied by lower courts in a manner that de facto interfered with arbitration. In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T Mobility, LLC (AT&T) included a PDAA which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs from bringing class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated on an individual basis. In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in district court, alleging that AT&T's practice of charging sales tax on a phone advertised as "free" was fraudulent.
79 In December 2006, after the Concepcions filed their claim, AT&T revised the arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T would pay a customer $7,500 and twice its attorney's fees if an arbitrator found in favor of a California customer on the merits of a customer dispute and awarded exclusive jurisdiction to Labor Commissioner to decide disputes arising under the Talent Agencies Act). 74 more than the last AT&T settlement offer.
80 Two years later, after the Concepcions' case was consolidated with a putative class action alleging, inter alia, identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the revised agreement.
81
The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement in light of Discover Bank v. Superior Court. 82 In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court applied the state's general unconscionability law 83 to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party "from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another." Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.
84
The district court in AT&T Mobility concluded that the class action waiver at issue was unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions and the efficient resolution of third-party claims.
85 The Ninth Circuit affirmed and AT&T sought review in the Supreme Court.
86
In a 5-4 majority decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court (joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito) held that the FAA preempts California's Discover Bank interpretation of the state's unconscionability rule, which, as the majority defined the rule, "classif Under California law, a court may refuse to enforce a contract that it finds "'to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,'" or it may "'limit the application of any unconscionable clause.'" AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1670.5(a) (1985)). "A finding of unconscionability requires a 'procedural' and a 'substantive' element, the former focusing on 'oppression' or 'surprise' due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on 'overly harsh' or 'one-sided' results." Id. (citations omitted). in all dispute resolution contracts, the majority was persuaded by research demonstrating that state courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable as opposed to other contracts. 89 Thus, the Discover Bank rule was preempted because "[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."
90
Justice Scalia's majority opinion reasoned that the Discover Bank rule interfered with arbitration because, while California's "rule does not require class-wide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post," thus defeating the purposes of the FAA.
91 The Court discussed three characteristics of class arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes of the FAA and hinder the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality and speed; (2) a requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review.
92 Exhibiting its distrust of class arbitration that also appeared in the Court's 2010 decision in
93 the Court characterized class arbitration as not arbitration at all within the meaning of the FAA, but a process that alters the fundamental attributes of arbitration.
94
Criticizing the majority's conclusion that class arbitration is lacking the "fundamental attribute value claims falling through the cracks of the legal system. 95 Justice Breyer opined that barring class arbitration and forcing lower courts to enforce adhesive class arbitration waivers would "have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims."
96 Justice Scalia responded to the dissent's concern by stating that "States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons."
97
Thus, under AT&T Mobility, the FAA preempts state laws that automatically void an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver. AT&T Mobility does not, however, stand for the proposition that the FAA displaces federal laws that regulate certain types of arbitration agreements to, inter alia, ban class action waivers. In the next Part, we describe those provisions of the federal securities laws that regulate arbitration between customers and their brokerage firms.
II. SEC AND FINRA REGULATION OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE EXCHANGE ACT
In adopting the Exchange Act in 1934 and in subsequent amendments,
98
Congress recognized that securities transactions are "affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of [securities] transactions and of practices and matters related thereto." corresponding duties necessarily assumed by those who deal in them." 100 The broker-dealer industry is highly regulated "because of its economic importance" and "the possibility of investor abuse."
101
The importance of investor protection and fairness is pervasive throughout the Exchange Act and in the regulation of broker-dealers. Three Exchange Act provisions give the SEC or FINRA authority to regulate PDAAs between customers and broker-dealers. Section 15A gives FINRA broad authority to regulate the broker-dealer industry, subject to SEC oversight. Two other provisions address agreements: § 29(a), which prohibits waivers of statutory or regulatory compliance, and § 15(o), which gives the SEC the power to ban PDAAs with respect to federal securities and SRO claims. We discuss below each of these provisions.
A. Exchange Act § 15A
Congress assigned the front-line authority for regulating the broker-dealer industry to SROs, including securities exchanges and national securities associations.
102 Industry self-regulation is "an essential and officially sanctioned part of the regulatory pattern."
103 Indeed, "it is doubtful whether any regulated industry has been allowed to regulate itself to the degree the securities industry has."
104 FINRA is registered with the SEC as a national securities association under Exchange Act § 15A
105 and is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.
106 Congress also adopted a comprehensive system of SEC oversight over the SROs, in order that self-regulation could accomplish its purpose of protecting investors and serving the public interest.
107 The SEC exercises oversight of FINRA's activities, including operation of its arbitration forum,
108
the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry.
109
As a national securities association, FINRA's raison d'etre is to carry out the statutory purposes and to enforce compliance by its members and associated persons with the provisions of the Exchange Act and its regulations 100 as well as FINRA's own rules. 110 The Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt rules that may be designed for a variety of purposes, ranging from preventing "fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices" to promoting "just and equitable principles of trade" and "in general, [protecting] investors and the public interest."
111 FINRA must file proposed rule changes with the SEC, and the SEC must publish notice and provide interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposal. 112 With only minor exceptions, no proposed rule change takes effect unless it is approved by the SEC, upon a finding that it is "consistent" with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the applicable regulations.
113 In addition, the SEC may, on its own initiative, amend FINRA's rules as it deems "necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of the purposes of the Act,"
114 thus giving the SEC further persuasive power to prod FINRA into action if necessary.
We discuss in Part III.D the specific FINRA rules at issue in the dispute between FINRA and Schwab.
115 These rules are the product of active engagement by both the SEC and FINRA in regulating the SRO securities arbitration process. At least since the mid-1970s the SEC has asserted the need for a nationwide investor dispute resolution system to handle small claims and has worked with the SROs, industry representatives and investor groups to develop arbitration rules to achieve this result. 116 Indeed, in McMahon, the SEC filed an amicus brief in support of SRO arbitration.
117 The SEC intensified its efforts after McMahon, when SRO arbitration became the principal forum for resolving customers' disputes with their brokers. 120 In its review of these proposed rule changes, the SEC consistently expressed its concerns about the fairness of the process. In the view of the SEC, fairness requires that investors have an understanding of the arbitration process and that arbitration should not unduly restrict rights and remedies that investors would have in court.
121 In short, SEC oversight over SRO securities arbitration has been long-standing and robust.
122

B. Exchange Act § 29(a)
Section 29(a) states that "any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance" with any provision of the Exchange Act or its rules "shall be void."
123 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the statute also applied to rules issued by securities exchanges; Dodd-Frank amended § 29(a) to include rules issued by all SROs. In the 1990s, several circuit courts considered the applicability of § 29(a) to contracts for underwriting capital between Lloyd's of London and U.S. residents.
134 According to the plaintiffs, Lloyd's solicited U.S. investors to raise capital and concealed the underwriting risks and massive liabilities relating to asbestos litigation. The contracts specified English choice of law and an English forum for investors' claims, and Lloyd's insisted that execution of the contracts take place on British soil. Although the plain meaning of § 29(a) prohibits a clause mandating application of English law, because such a clause is a "provision binding any person . . . to waive compliance with any provision of [the] Act,"
135 the circuit courts uniformly upheld the choice of law clause on the ground that these were international transactions among sophisticated investors. Importantly, however, the courts recognized that the available English remedies must be "adequate substitutes" for federal securities laws.
136
Thus, while these opinions carve out a questionable exception for international securities contracts among sophisticated investors, they do not detract from the McMahon principle that § 29(a) forbids agreements that weaken investors' protections under federal securities (or equivalent) laws.
Lower courts have interpreted § 29(a) in the context of contracts other than arbitration agreements. These decisions have established that § 29(a) does not permit provisions that weaken investors' ability to recover under the federal securities laws, no matter what form they take: "non-reliance" clauses in stock purchase agreements, 137 "no-action" clauses in indentures, 138 clauses that provide for an alternative remedy, 139 or clauses that specify indemnification as the sole remedy. 140 The only situation in which some courts have enforced nonreliance clauses is negotiated contracts among sophisticated investors or corporate insiders where the written agreement contains specific representations and the non-reliance clause serves the purpose of barring were large enough to require no aggregation. 
C. Exchange Act § 15(o)
The third Exchange Act provision authorizing the SEC or FINRA to regulate broker-customer arbitration agreements stems from Dodd-Frank and is a response to the ongoing post-McMahon debate over the fairness of SRO securities arbitration.
144 The Treasury Department's 2009 white paper on financial reform expressed concern that PDAAs' eliminating access to courts "may unjustifiably undermine investor interests."
145 It recommended an amendment to the federal securities laws to give the SEC clear authority to prohibit PDAAs in brokerage agreements with retail customers after further study of the issue. 142. See Harsco, 91 F.3d at 343 (recognizing that plaintiff's remedies were weakened, but emphasizing that this was a detailed written agreement negotiated among sophisticated parties). Harsco was distinguished in MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P., 2001 WL 1478812 (distinguishing Harsco because plaintiffs alleged that they attempted to confirm truth of agreement's representations, but were "duped" by false answers).
143. The only reported case directly addressing this issue is Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1950), where the court held that a contract between a brokerage firm's employee and his common-law wife to deal in stocks as partners was not invalid as constituting a waiver of the woman's protection under a stock exchange rule that a member's employee may not have an interest in a customer's account. Under § 15(o), the SEC has the broad authority to ban the use of PDAAs altogether with respect to federal securities class actions and SRO claims, so long as it found that it was in the public interest and for the protection of investors. Ipso facto, the SEC can ban the use of class action waivers, at least 147. See Gross, supra note 16, at 1177-78 (noting that 2009 legislation to invalidate PDAAs expressly extended coverage to securities industry disputes through its definition of "consumer dispute," but also noting that this legislation did not pass). with respect to federal securities and SRO claims, so long as it makes the requisite findings. Congress, recognizing that there were grounds for concern about the use of PDAAs in customer agreements, authorized the SEC to protect investors from brokers' overreaching, even if this conflicts with the policies and purposes of the FAA as interpreted by the Court.
D. FINRA Rules at Issue in the Schwab Dispute
We turn now to the pertinent SRO rules and regulations enacted pursuant to these Exchange Act provisions that are involved in the dispute between Schwab and FINRA. In this section, we detail FINRA's reasons for proposing these rules and the SEC's findings in approving the rules.
Disclosures about the arbitration process; prohibiting inconsistent conditions (current FINRA Rule 2268)
FINRA Rule 2268 152 sets forth requirements for broker-dealers' use of PDAAs for customer accounts. As more fully described below, this rule mandates disclosure of certain information about the arbitration process and prohibits certain conditions that are inconsistent with SRO arbitration. It also sets forth formatting requirements to make the required disclosures more visible and readable. Violation of the rule subjects member firms to disciplinary action 153 and could lead courts to invalidate any infringing PDAA. The precursor of FINRA Rule 2268-Article III, Section 21 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice-was first adopted in 1989 as part of a package of uniform arbitration rules proposed in response to McMahon by a number of SROs that operated arbitration forums. The rule was designed to improve disclosure to customers in account opening statements and to restrict the content of PDAAs.
155 Specifically:
The proposals would require broker-dealers that employ predispute arbitration clauses to place immediately before the clause introductory language that would inform customers that they are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, that arbitration is final, that discovery is generally more limited than in court proceedings, that the award is not required to contain factual findings and legal reasoning, and that the arbitration panel typically will include a minority of arbitrators associated with the securities industry.
The proposal requires that the disclosure language be highlighted in four ways. First, large or otherwise distinguishable type must be used. Second, the disclosure language must be set out in outline form so as to be noticeable to readers. Third, a statement, also highlighted, that provides that the agreement contains a predispute arbitration clause, and where that clause is located in the contract, must be inserted into the agreement immediately preceding the signature line. Fourth, a copy of the agreement containing a predispute agreement must be given to the customer, who is to acknowledge receipt of the agreement, either in the agreement itself or in a separate document.
The proposal also prohibits SRO members from having agreements with customers that limit or contradict the rules of any SRO or limit the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the ability of the arbitrators to make any award.
156
In approving the rule, the SEC identified two principal benefits to investors. First, the disclosure provisions "address many of the concerns regarding customer notice and choice that have been considered over recent years" and the language "should promote more knowledgeable acquiescence or rejection by customers of arbitration provisions."
157 Second, the prohibition against inconsistent conditions was necessary because "agreements cannot be used to curtail any rights that a party may otherwise have had in a judicial forum." 158 Accordingly, the new rule "appropriately balance[s] the need to strengthen investor confidence in the arbitration systems at the SROs . . . with the need to maintain arbitration as a form of dispute resolution that provides for equitable and efficient administration of justice."
159
By 1995, however, NASD became aware that some broker-dealers were using PDAAs containing provisions that were "inconsistent" with the NASD 160 Firms were impermissibly attempting to dictate the location for the arbitration hearing, shorten the applicable statute of limitations, and limit the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages, among other problems. NASD warned that the use of PDAAs that were inconsistent with its Rule 3110(f) may subject NASD members to disciplinary action.
In 1998, NASD found it necessary to file with the SEC a proposed rule change to require additional disclosure in PDAAs about the arbitration process because "investor representatives have expressed concern that many customers who sign predispute arbitration agreements still do not understand adequately what they are agreeing to. Customers' perceptions of unfairness are heightened by the fact that, in order to open an account, they are forced to agree to SROsponsored arbitration."
161 NASD was principally focused on some firms' use of choice-of-law clauses to select a state law that was favorable to the firm 162 and the perceived unfairness to the customer, who would not understand the significance of the choice of law and its effect on investors' claims.
The rule, as ultimately approved by the SEC in 2004, required a fuller description of differences between arbitration and court proceedings. It retained the prohibition on broker-dealers inserting in their customers' arbitration clauses "any condition that: (1) limits or contradicts the rules of any selfregulatory organization; (2) limits the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration; . . . [and] (4) limits the ability of arbitrators to make any award."
163
Instead of mandating language that would regulate choice of law provisions (to which some claimants' representatives objected), the rule added another category of prohibited provision: any that "(3) limits the ability of a party to file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules of the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement."
164 In its approval order, the SEC found that it should provide customers with "clearer and enhanced disclosure regarding the terms of predispute arbitration agreements" and that the new rule "incorporates important protections into the text of the arbitration agreement itself."
165 In addition, the new language prohibiting the use of restrictive conditions "achieve [d] an appropriate balance between the interests of investors and the ability of parties to agree contractually to fair terms that would govern their disputes." 166 In approving this new language, the SEC reiterated its view that broker-dealer PDAAs could not limit investors' rights and remedies.
Class action claims (current FINRA Rules 12204, 2268(f))
Prior to 1992, NASD did not have a rule expressly dealing with class claims. Through the public comment process of the 1989 rule changes, one commenter suggested that the SROs should establish procedures for class actions. 167 The SEC responded that SICA was considering a policy whereby all SROs will decline jurisdiction over class action litigation unless the class certification and representation issues have first been resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. At that time, under the SROs' existing rules, both the SROs and the arbitrators for a particular case may determine whether the facilities of the SRO are adequate to handle the litigation, or whether parties should be referred to their remedies at law.
168
NASD, however, never adopted such a policy. Instead, in 1992, NASD proposed a class action rule in response to the SEC's concern that investors should have access to the courts in appropriate cases, including class actions.
169
While the rule's language has been rewritten over the years, the substance of the rule has not changed.
170 First, the NASD arbitration forum would not accept class action claims.
171 Second, the forum would not permit arbitration of individual claims based on the same facts and law and involving the same defendants as in a class-certified or putative class action unless the claimant established that he was not participating in the class action. Third, the broker may not enforce any arbitration agreement against a member of a certified or putative class action until the class action was denied certification or the member was excluded or withdrew from the class. 172 Finally, FINRA amended the rule governing the content of PDAAs to require a statement prohibiting persons from bringing class actions in arbitration and from attempting to enforce an arbitration agreement against a member of a class action.
173
In proposing the bar on class actions in the arbitration forum, NASD made clear its view that investors should have the opportunity to pursue class claims in appropriate cases. It determined that courts were the preferable forum for class claims, because they already had in place procedures to manage class claims. Moreover, firms should not be able to defeat class actions by enforcing an arbitration agreement against class members. Thus, the NASD rule recognized that class actions were important for investor protection and reflected an efficient allocation of resources between two dispute resolution systems. Accordingly, the proposed rule provided that class actions and claims of individual class members would not be eligible for arbitration at NASD, regardless of any PDAA.
174
In approving the rule, the SEC expressed its agreement with NASD's position that investors should have access to courts to pursue class action claims:
in all cases, class actions are better handled by the courts and that investors should have access to courts to resolve class actions efficiently. In the past, individuals who attempted to certify class actions in litigation were subject to enforcement of their separate arbitration contracts by their broker-dealers. Investors may benefit by combining similar claims to achieve efficiencies and cost-savings. FINRA permits joinder of claims in certain circumstances.
176
Claimants may join multiple claims in the same arbitration if (1) the claims contain common questions of law or fact, and (2) the claims assert any right to relief jointly and severally, or the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. The Director of Arbitration has the discretion to consolidate or sever claims; his discretion is preliminary and may be reconsidered by the panel.
177 NASD's pre-McMahon arbitration rules contained a provision permitting joinder of similar claims;
178 the substance of the provisions has not changed during the subsequent revisions of the arbitration rules and has engendered little discussion.
179
In the next Part, we narrow in on the conflict between Schwab and FINRA with respect to the class and consolidated action waiver in the Schwab customer agreement.
III. THE SCHWAB-FINRA SHOWDOWN
In October 2011, FINRA member Schwab amended its customer agreement to force customers to agree not to bring or participate in class actions or class arbitrations against Schwab.
180 In addition, the amended agreement requires customers to agree that arbitrators have no authority to consolidate more than one party's claims. Instead, customers must bring their claims "solely in individual capacities." Noting that Schwab instituted this judicial proceeding within hours after the disciplinary complaint was served, FINRA argued that Schwab failed to meet the prerequisite for filing a federal lawsuit-exhaustion of its administrative remedies.
193
On May 11, 2012, the federal district court in California granted FINRA's motion to dismiss Schwab's complaint on the ground that Schwab failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
194 Notably, the court stated that the interpretation of FINRA's Rule 2268, which FINRA argued prohibits brokerage firms from including a class action waiver in their arbitration clauses, is an issue "squarely within the expertise of FINRA, as well as the SEC." Schwab announced soon after the district court's decision that it would not enforce the class action waiver in its customer agreements until the FINRA disciplinary action is final, and the time to appeal from that decision has lapsed.
195
Schwab's brazen challenge to FINRA's authority to proscribe language in its customer arbitration clauses raises, on its merits, an issue no court appears to have addressed: does the FAA's mandate to treat arbitration agreements the same as other contracts and to enforce them according to their terms yield in the face of the conflicting policy of the Exchange Act to assure fairness and to protect investors?
IV. RECONCILING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FAA AND THE EXCHANGE ACT As described above, the Schwab controversy poses a direct conflict between the policies of the FAA and the Exchange Act.
196 Which statute governs? On the one hand, in Casarotto, the Court held that the FAA displaces a state law that imposes specific disclosure requirements on arbitration agreements. 197 In AT&T Mobility, the Court upheld a class action waiver because states cannot restrict the terms in an arbitration agreement even if "desirable for unrelated reasons."
198 On the other hand, the Court has declared repeatedly that the FAA's mandate is not absolute: it "may be overridden by a contrary Congressional command." 199 193. Id. Schwab did not assert valid reasons for bypassing the disciplinary proceeding-either that the disciplinary proceeding would be too time-consuming or that the FINRA and SEC adjudicators lack the expertise to address issues outside of securities law or FINRA rules. The Exchange Act gives the SEC and FINRA broad authority to regulate the broker-dealer industry in order to protect investors. FINRA regulations promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act-which have the force of federal law-impose specific disclosure requirements on arbitration agreements, forbid class action waivers and permit joinder of claims, in order to make the arbitration process fairer. As described more fully below, under accepted canons of statutory construction, including the implied repeal doctrine, as well as under Exchange Act and FAA jurisprudence, FINRA's regulations of arbitration clauses in brokerage firms' customer agreements should prevail in the face of a challenge under the FAA because, consistent with the policies underlying the Exchange Act, they were adopted to assure fair treatment and protect investors.
A. The FAA is Impliedly Repealed by the Exchange Act
The traditional doctrine of implied repeal
When inconsistent laws emanate from a single legislature, absent an express exemption clause in either, the Supreme Court reconciles them by applying the long-standing canon of statutory construction known as the implied repeal doctrine. Long disfavored and limited to narrow circumstances, 200 the doctrine applies only when necessary to make a later enactment work, 201 and even then applies only to the extent necessary to reconcile the conflicting laws. 202 The burden is on the party seeking the implied repeal to show congressional intent to override the former law, which can be proven through (1) the text of the law, (2) its legislative history, or (3) an inherent conflict between the edict of the former law and the underlying purpose of the latter.
203 "Although not explicitly stated in the case law, it is self-evident that the 'inherent conflict' test requires a balancing of the legislative interests in play in a particular case."
204
Under the traditional test for implied repeal, if the latter law is "plainly repugnant" to the former so that they cannot be read as a single law, then the latter enactment "impliedly repeals" the former.
205 However, "[i]mplied repeal does not automatically result from the mere existence of a newer statute on the same subject; such a construction of the doctrine would mean the legislature could never enact complementary, remedial, or cumulative laws in the same area." 206 Professor Markham eloquently described the doctrine:
One of the oldest canons of statutory interpretation is the implied repeal doctrine, whose earliest articulation is found in Lord Coke's 1614 decision in Dr. Foster's Case. In its traditional formulation, implied repeal has been understood to be a very narrow doctrine that reconciles older and newer enactments by minimally paring back older law where there is no plausible understanding of the laws that can avoid the inconsistency. Courts apply this doctrine rarely because it is limited to reconciling laws that are so 'plainly repugnant' to one another that they are incapable of coexisting. Even when faced with plainly incompatible enactments, the doctrine allows for only the most modest displacement of the earlier law.
207
The Supreme Court has applied the traditional test to displace federal antitrust laws in favor of conflicting securities laws. In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 208 a group of investors challenged as anticompetitive the New York Stock Exchange's and American Stock Exchange's rules that fixed commission rates. 209 In light of text in the Exchange Act 210 specifically authorizing the SEC to fix reasonable rates of commission along with legislative history of recent amendments, 211 the Court found that an implied repeal of the Sherman Act was necessary to fulfill the intent of Congress. Gordon, 422 U.S. at 665-67. In a confusing factual twist, the relevant amendments, which did not take effect until after the case was heard before the Supreme Court, banned the very practice challenged as anticompetitive. Id. at 690. While this indicates Congress' intent was in fact compatible with the plaintiffs' interpretation of antitrust laws on the subject matter of commission rate fixing, the Court focused on the continued grant of regulatory and oversight power to the SEC, which would allow the SEC to set fixed commission rates in the future. mutual fund companies that restricted the transferability of mutual fund shares on the secondary market for a price other than the initial public offering. 214 The relevant portions of the Investment Company Act permitted funds to make their own transferability restrictions so long as the SEC did not affirmatively disapprove of the provision.
215 Again finding that the SEC was actively engaged in oversight-even if not acting in the specific instances in questionthe Court held that the Sherman Act was impliedly repealed by the subsequent grant of authority to the SEC. 
The Credit Suisse formulation of implied repeal
The Court employed the "plain repugnancy" test for over a century, only very recently loosening its stringency.
217 Thus, in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 218 the Court refined the "plain repugnancy" test by adding four factors for courts to consider when choosing between conflicting federal laws. Credit Suisse stemmed from a class action against multiple investment banks, which formed underwriting syndicates for the initial public offerings (IPO) of technology companies. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws through the underwriters' various IPO sales practices, including laddering and tying, that artificially inflated stock prices and resulted in excessive commissions to investors. 219 The underwriters moved to dismiss the antitrust complaints "on the ground that federal securities laws [including SEC regulations and NASD Conduct Rules] impliedly precludes application of antitrust laws to the conduct in question."
220 After the district court dismissed the complaints and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court first looked to its precedent that specifically addressed conflicts between securities law and antitrust law.
221 After surveying that authority, the Court articulated four factors relevant to determining whether "there is a 'clear repugnancy' between the securities law and the antitrust complaint-or as we shall subsequently describe the matter, whether the two are "'clearly incompatible'":
(1) The existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise that authority; . . . (3) 
222
Applying this four-factor test, the Court readily concluded that the SEC was authorized to and in fact had on several occasions regulated the underwriting process, a process important to financial market activities regulated by securities laws.
223 The Court also decided that the complexity of the SEC regulations and the fact that the same evidence would be used to prove causes of action under both laws made it possible that courts could generate conflicting opinions in mixed antitrust-securities suits about acceptable underwriting practices, thus creating a conflict. 224 The Court thus found clear incompatibility between these potential inconsistencies, even though the specific practices at issue had been clearly condemned by the SEC. 
Precedent for implied repeal of the FAA
The Court once considered an alleged conflict between the FAA and the Exchange Act under the traditional test for implied repeal. In McMahon, investors argued that Exchange Act § 29(a) (the anti-waiver provision) barred the arbitrability of claims arising under the Act, but the broker-dealer argued that the FAA mandated enforcement of the arbitration agreement for the statutory claims. The Court analyzed the conflict as an "implied repeal" question and announced that "the burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue," and that such intent would be "'deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history,' or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose."
226
Ultimately, the Court found that Congress did not intend to require a judicial forum for the resolution of individual Exchange Act claims, and that arbitration conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the Commission does not weaken investors' ability to recover under the Act. In contrast, lower federal courts have found implied repeal of the FAA in the face of other conflicting federal statutes. For example, several circuits have declined to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement in core bankruptcy proceedings because it would conflict with the underlying purposes of the federal Bankruptcy Code.
228 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that the Carmack Amendment, which was originally enacted before the FAA in 1906, and which regulates contract claims for interstate shipping and disallows arbitration agreements, displaced the FAA.
229 Because the relevant portions of the statute creating a conflict had been added by amendment after enactment of the FAA, the court found that the FAA was impliedly repealed.
230
In addition, administrative agencies have ruled that the FAA yields to their interpretation that claims arising under statutes they are mandated to enforce are not arbitrable. For example, the Federal Trade Commission has concluded that claims arising under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are not arbitrable. 231 The National Labor Relations Board recently held that federal labor law, which emphasizes the right of employees to join in collective action and provides a substantive right to engage in "concerted activity," bars collective and class action waivers in labor and employment contracts, even in an arbitration agreement.
232
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that it would not be unprecedented for a federal court or the SEC, upon review of a FINRA disciplinary action, to reason that the FAA is impliedly repealed by the Exchange Act for purposes of invalidating a class action waiver in a broker-dealer's PDAA. In the next section, we establish that the Supreme Court's current test for implied repeal 234 Thus, the SEC has the express authority to ban PDAAs altogether in customer agreements, as well as the power to impose any condition or limitation on that PDAA, which surely includes an anti-investor provision such as a class action waiver. Third, conflict between FINRA rules and the FAA is not only possible, it has happened in the context of the Schwab dispute. First, the FAA mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms, whereas FINRA Rule 2268-which requires member firms to preserve the class action remedy for investors 239 -precludes Schwab from enforcing its arbitration agreement with its customers as written.
240 Additionally, FINRA Rule 12204 prescribes the manner in which customers can bring and participate in class actions against member firms, and Rules 12312-14 empower arbitrators to consolidate claims.
241 Therefore, FINRA forum rules, which clearly permit class actions in court and joinder of claims in arbitration to further the statute's underlying purpose of investor protection, conflict with Schwab's class and consolidated action waiver. This conflict also satisfies McMahon's requirement that the opponent of arbitration demonstrate "an inherent conflict between arbitration and the [Exchange Act's] underlying purpose."
242
It is possible, and perhaps preferable, to find no conflict between the FAA and the FINRA rules at issue. Unlike the Montana statute held invalid in Cassarotto, which required a warning about arbitration and thus reflects antiarbitration bias, the FINRA rules at issue are intended to make investors aware of the "existence, nature, and effect of PDAAs" 243 and to improve SRO arbitration so that it is a "fair, expeditious, and economical means for resolution 244 taking into account the interests of investors, broker-dealers and the public. These SEC-approved FINRA rules reflect concern for arbitration's fairness rather than anti-arbitration bias. Indeed, the SEC expressed its support for SRO arbitration at the time of McMahon.
245 In contrast, the FAA's underlying purpose is to eliminate laws that demonstrate an anti-arbitration bias.
246 Under this interpretation, the FINRA rules still prevail. A court could apply FINRA rules as written because they do not "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."
247
As for the fourth Credit Suisse factor-the type of conduct sought to be regulated-resolution of disputes and investor protection is at the core of the relationship between customers and broker-dealers, which the Exchange Act clearly intended to regulate.
248 Congress understood that investor confidence was essential for the maintenance of effective securities markets and that market forces alone could not ensure adequate investor protection.
249 This is particularly the case with respect to the broker-dealer industry since it performs activities that are essential to the securities markets.
250 Moreover, the confidence of retail investors in securities markets is highly dependent on their trust and confidence in the broker-dealers and their associated members with 244 . E.g., NASD Notice to Members 89-21, supra note 119. The Ruder Report, for example, found that arbitration is preferable to civil litigation and recommends additional uniform "investor-friendly" provisions because PDAAs are generally not the result of arm's length negotiations. RUDER REPORT, supra note 118, at 7-8. 245 249. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 100, at 153 (explaining the importance of protecting investors through uniform minimum standards of competence, experience, character and capital).
250. Id. at 237 (describing "fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary obligations" that brokerdealers owe to deal fairly with the public). whom they conduct business; believing that their brokers are treating them fairly is an essential component of investor trust and confidence. 251 As a result, active regulation of the dispute resolution forum used to resolve virtually all customer-broker disputes affects "practices that lie squarely within an area of financial market activity that the securities law seeks to regulate."
252
In our view, therefore, Congress' delegation of power to the SEC and FINRA to regulate all aspects of the broker-dealer industry, found in Exchange Act § 15A, including specifically PDAAs in Exchange Act § 15(o), displaces the expression of national policy embodied in the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms. In short, brokerage firms should not be able to invoke the FAA to justify their removal of investors' class action remedy when conflicting FINRA rules mandate that customers have access to that remedy.
Deference to SEC as an administrative agency
To the extent there is any ambiguity as to whether FINRA's rules bar class action waivers in customer agreements, courts should give substantial deference to the SEC's interpretation of its own rule-making authority and FINRA's interpretation of its Commission-approved rules.
253
Courts give substantial deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute 254 as well as an administrative rule that interprets the issuing agency's own ambiguous regulation. 255 An agency interpreting an ambiguous statute may receive substantial deference if "Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."
256 Under the Chevron deference test, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
257
Ultimately, courts determine the degree of deference based on the circumstances of each case, considering factors such as the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, relative expertness, and the persuasiveness of its position.
258 If the agency's action carries the force of law, then it is entitled to deference. An agency's authority to engage in adjudication or "notice and comment" rulemaking, defined in the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 553), is a strong indication that Congress intended the agency to create rules that carry the force of law. 259 Deference may be broadened when the regulation concerns "a complex and highly technical regulatory program" in which the identification and classification of relevant "criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns."
260
The Commission expressly stated that it enacted the predecessor to Rule 2268 for the specific purpose of ensuring that investors have access to courts for class action claims. 261 In its approval order, the Commission noted that the new rule "will ensure that arbitration agreements clearly state the class action claims are specifically outside the scope of arbitration contracts entered into by members." 262 As discussed above, the SEC clearly had Congressional authority to act in this context. 263 In determining a question of implied repeal in earlier cases, the Court stated that a "consistent and longstanding interpretation by the agency charged with administration of the Act [the SEC], while not controlling, is entitled to considerable weight." 264 Moreover, FINRA rules are approved by the SEC through "notice and comment" rule-making. 265 Thus, courts should accord substantial deference to the Commission's and FINRA's view that FINRA Rule 2268 bars class action waivers in customer agreements.
B. Exchange Act's Specific Rules Displace the FAA's General Mandate
Another relevant canon of statutory construction provides that, in the context of interpreting and applying conflicting regulations, the more specific regulation trumps the general one. 266 This rule applies when the difference between the specific and general rule is clear. It is also treated not as a firm rule of construction, but a factor often considered among other matters of fairness and conflict in order to determine exemptions.
267 Pursuant to this canon of construction, any SEC or SRO rules affecting PDAAs would likely be controlling following the passage of Exchange Act § 15 (o) 268 and the amendment of Exchange Act § 29(a) to include SRO rules. 269 The relevant language of the Exchange Act is more specific than any portion of the FAA that would apply to the Schwab agreement. This specific language in the Exchange Act accompanied by precise SRO rules would likely be enforced rather than the general mandates of the FAA.
Furthermore, the regulators devising these specific rules have far more expertise in this complex area than the generalist pronouncements of the Supreme Court interpreting the FAA. As we have described, the SEC and FINRA have, since McMahon, engaged in an ongoing examination and revision of the SRO arbitration process and its rules to meet the needs of investors, broker-dealers and the general public. Their rulemaking has been guided by two realities: (1) virtually all customers' disputes with their brokers are resolved in the SRO forum, and (2) investors' trust and confidence in their brokers is paramount to maintaining strong capital markets. Accordingly, the federal regulators, based on their understanding of the industry, have determined that some investors' claims can be better handled if aggregated. If 272 the Court held that arbitration panels, and not the courts, had the power to decide whether a SRO time limitation for bringing claims had expired. In both instances, the Court supported the SRO's position in the face of plausible contract arguments to the contrary. 273 It is true that deference to FINRA policies was, in those cases, consistent with the Court's pro-arbitration policy, while deference to FINRA policy in the Schwab case could be viewed as inconsistent with AT&T Mobility's support for the class action waiver. Nevertheless, we submit that there is nothing in AT&T Mobility that establishes that class action waivers are enforceable notwithstanding federal regulators' determination that they are contrary to the public interest in a particular context. Indeed, we recognize that the balancing of policy interests may well be different in other contexts. The importance of investors' trust and confidence in their broker-dealer relationships may not be applicable in other commercial relationships like the wireless service contract in AT&T Mobility. Accordingly, it would be unfortunate if the Court's unwavering support for the FAA to date is construed to prohibit federal regulators, acting pursuant to Congressional authority, from taking into account important policy considerations in constructing the appropriate dispute resolution system to deal with matters within their field of expertise. 
C. Arguments Not Limited to the Broker-Dealer Context
Thus far, we have focused on the dispute between FINRA and Schwab over the firm's prohibition against aggregating claims and have demonstrated how the SEC and FINRA's authority under the Exchange Act to prohibit the firm's contract term displaces contrary policy under the FAA. As previously noted, there have also been recent efforts to amend governance documents of publicly traded issuers to require arbitration and prohibit aggregation of claims. 274 The SEC opposed these corporate governance maneuvers on the ground that they would violate the federal securities laws. The SEC clearly took the position that, the FAA notwithstanding, the securities laws it was empowered to enforce prohibited public entities from inserting provisions in governance documents that would weaken investors' rights and remedies.
In this section we set forth additional arguments under the Exchange Act and the FAA that are broadly applicable to void any purported class-action waiver under the federal securities laws.
The Exchange Act's anti-waiver provision
An additional argument for the displacement of the FAA by the Exchange Act in the Schwab dispute that is applicable outside the context of brokerdealer regulation is also based on Exchange Act § 29(a): a securities classaction waiver violates the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws because the waiver effectively amounts to the loss of the individual investors' private remedy. As the McMahon majority stated, Exchange Act § 29(a) "is concerned with whether the agreement 'weakens [customers'] ability to recover under the Exchange Act.'" 275 It is well-established that § 29(a), as amended by Dodd-Frank, does not permit provisions that weaken investors' ability to recover under the federal securities laws, including FINRA rules, no matter what form they take. 276 Schwab's combination of a PDAA, a class action waiver and a prohibition on combining claimants with similar claims means that the only remedy available to every customer is an individual claim, Similarly, the proposals to include class action waivers in corporate governance documents also serve to eliminate, as a practical matter, remedies for investors with small federal securities claims. The high costs of pursuing federal securities claims means that, unless a class-wide remedy is available, there is, as a practical matter, no remedy for investors with small holdings. A class action waiver in this context is the equivalent of a surrender of investor protections prohibited by the anti-waiver provisions. Ironically, Congress confirmed the importance of the federal securities class action in the PSLRA, legislation that came about largely through the lobbying efforts of the business community. The PSLRA sought to weed out frivolous suits through a variety of procedural and other measures, in lieu of eliminating federal securities class actions altogether, as business interests urged.
279 In choosing to cure, but not to eliminate the securities class action, Congress determined that a collective-action remedy is necessary for investor protection, especially retail investors. 280 In the PSLRA, Congress thus confirmed the importance of the federal securities class action to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets. 
The class action waiver is unenforceable because investors cannot vindicate their statutory rights
In addition to arguments grounded in the Exchange Act's specific language, arguments based on the Court's FAA jurisprudence also support Regulatory Auth., Inc., (No. C-12-00518 EDL) 2012 WL 1408607 (stating that Schwab inserted the class action waiver after AT&T Mobility, "to protect its shareholders and customers from the high costs and inefficiencies associated with customer class actions" and "mindful of the fact that FINRA Dispute Resolution provides a successful arbitration forum for customers, including simplified arbitration for small claims").
278. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text; see also Gross, supra note 17 (arguing that small claims arbitration, which is primarily a document-based hearing, lacks procedural justice). voiding Schwab's class action waiver. Challengers to Schwab's class action waiver can also argue that it is unenforceable under the "vindicating statutory rights" doctrine. Under this doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Mitsubishi 282 that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function," a disputant can argue that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable because an unfair aspect of the arbitration process would preclude that party from vindicating its statutory rights. 283 Proposals to include class action waivers in corporate governance documents are similarly unenforceable under Mitsubishi.
Lower courts have applied this doctrine post-AT&T Mobility to void class action waivers in non-securities contexts. For example, in In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 284 a purported class action arising under federal antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action waiver clause in a credit card agreement was unenforceable under the FAA 285 because "enforcement of the clause would effectively preclude any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs'] statutory rights." 286 The Court of Appeals found that AT&T Mobility did not alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than AT&T Mobility. 287 Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized, "[h]ere. . .our holding rests squarely on a 'vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of arbitrability.'" 288 Because plaintiffs demonstrated through expert testimony that pursuing their statutory claims individually, as opposed to through class arbitration, would not be economically feasible, thereby "effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws," 289 the Second Circuit directed the district court to deny defendant's motion to compel arbitration.
290
Schwab customers could argue that the class action and joinder waiver in their PDAA precludes their ability to effectively bring claims arising under the Exchange Act against Schwab. Scholars and practitioners alike concur that, absent the class action mechanism, disputants aggrieved through misconduct by an entity with superior bargaining power-although in small amounts individually but large amounts collectively-have no legal remedy that is economically feasible to pursue. [t]he decision will make it harder for people with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of arbitration, the Second Circuit's analysis in Amex III is even more compelling. Based on the need to use experts to establish elements such as causation, reliance and damages, 292 the costs of proving a federal securities fraud claim in arbitration would be so large as to make pursuing an individual claim infeasible except possibly for large investors that have suffered significant losses. Thus, individual investors can establish that, under Mitsubishi, an arbitration clause with a class action waiver is not enforceable because they would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights in individualized, small claims arbitration.
CONCLUSION
Persuasive statutory, legal and policy reasons support the contention that Schwab cannot seek refuge in the FAA to force its customers to waive their rights to pursue a class action or consolidated arbitration against the firm. Schwab's efforts to effectively immunize itself from liability against individual retail customers for misconduct impacting more than one customer at a time contradicts existing statutory protections for investors found throughout the Exchange Act. Congress' more recent and quite specific pronouncement combined with its delegation of rule-making authority over broker-dealers to the SEC-which is uniquely situated in a complex regulatory environment with the requisite expertise to exercise sound judgment and devise policies and rules to further its statutory mandate of investor protection-displaces the Supreme Court's general pronouncement that arbitration agreements should be enforced according to their terms. This general pronouncement is not absolute: exceptions abound for, inter alia, contrary Congressional commands, common law contract defenses applicable to all contracts, and agreements that do not permit disputants to vindicate their statutory rights. While AT&T Mobility empowers courts to preempt state laws displaying anti-arbitration bias, and CompuCredit permits the arbitrability of statutory claims in the absence of conflicting federal regulations, no authority exists for the astounding proposition that Schwab has advanced: that the FAA limits the ability of federal regulators acting pursuant to authority under Exchange Act to impose conditions and limitations on the use of arbitration provisions in customer agreements in order to protect investors and ensure fairness.
At its core, reconciling conflicting federal statutes boils down to distilling Congressional intent. Congress has not yet passed a law banning predispute arbitration agreements in most consumer PDAAs, although it has given the claims that stem from corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful compensation'" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
